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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since this nation’s inception, the United States Supreme Court 
has grappled with conceptualizing marriage in a way that reflects both 
this nation’s values and this nation’s Constitution.  Conceptualizing 
marriage in a concordant way has proven to be a time-intensive task, 
leading the Supreme Court to analyze a variety of factual scenarios to 
determine which relationships fall within the protective confines of the 
Constitution.  Over time, the Court’s perception of marriage has 
adapted to changing societal norms, encompassing issues such as race,1 
poverty,2 and criminality.3  The limits of such adaptation were tested in 
recent years, when courts were faced with the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage. 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage and the related fundamental right to marry in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.4  In Obergefell, a class of homosexual plaintiffs claimed that their 
constitutional rights were violated when they were denied the right to 
marry their same-sex partner.5  Ultimately, on June 26, 2015, the 
Supreme Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor and held that a 
fundamental right to marry protects marriages between same-sex 
couples.6 
In the wake of Obergefell, one of the main criticisms of the majority 
opinion is that it will reduce governmental restriction of marriage, 
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 1  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 2  See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 3  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 4  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).  
 5  Id. at 2593.  
 6  Id. at 2607.  
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thereby opening the floodgates to marriages of all sorts.  For example, 
some have questioned whether the fundamental right to marry 
recognized by Obergefell also includes the right to marry multiple 
people.7  Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell questions the 
viability of a definition of marriage that is limited to those unions 
between two people.  In his view, the majority calls this definition and 
its limit into question.8  He also suggests that an extension of the 
fundamental right to marry to polygamous marriages may be even 
more natural than an extension of the right to same-sex marriages, 
since polygamous marriages are more deeply steeped in some global 
cultural traditions.9 
Similarly, a New York Times op-ed piece by William Baude, 
published soon after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Obergefell, questioned the validity and power of a two-person limit.10  
Like Chief Justice Roberts, Baude argued that the jump from same-sex 
marriage to plural marriage is not a large one, especially since the 
majority’s opinion focused primarily on a “fundamental right to 
marry,” rather than the narrow issue of sexual orientation.11  Baude 
explains that the “fundamental right to marry” is more loosely defined, 
and is characterized by concepts such as autonomy, personal 
fulfillment, child rearing, and social order.12  This broad judicial 
conceptualization of marriage may therefore include and protect 
 
 7  There are three types of plural marriage, or what is more colloquially referred 
to as “polygamy”: (1) polygyny, the most common type, in which one man is married 
to two or more wives; (2) polyandry, in which one woman is married to two or more 
husbands; and (3) polygynandry, a group marriage in which two or more wives are 
simultaneously married to two or more husbands.  Alean Al-Krenawi & Vered Slonim-
Nevo, Psychosocial and Familial Functioning of Children from Polygynous and Monogamous 
Families, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 745 (2008).  In accordance with both statistics and 
relevant literature, this Comment will use the term “polygamy” interchangeably with 
“polygyny.”  See Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, 
para. 136 (Can.) (“Over the course of human history, polygyny has been the only form 
of polygamy practiced on a significant basis.  Polyandry has been exceedingly rare and 
has tended to be a temporary adaptation to environmental stresses or other ecological 
factors.”). 
 8  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) 
(“One immediate question invited by the majority’s position is whether the States may 
retain the definition of marriage as a union of two people.  Although the majority 
randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various places, it offers no reason at all why the 
two-person element of the core definition of marriage may be preserved while the 
man-woman elements may not.”). 
 9  Id.  
 10  William Baude, Is Polygamy Next?, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/is-polygamy-next.html?_r=0.  
 11  Id.  
 12  Id.  
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“groups of adults who have profound polyamorous attachments and 
wish to build families and join the community.”13 
This Comment examines the fundamental right to marry and 
analyze whether Obergefell compels the recognition of plural marriages.  
Part II of this Comment will briefly summarize the Supreme Court’s 
rulings on the fundamental right to marry and the closely associated 
right to privacy.  This Part highlights the Court’s different (and at 
times, disparate) approaches in cases dealing with a fundamental right 
to marry.  Part III will then discuss the fundamental right to marry in 
the wake of Obergefell.  Here, the main question is whether the Court 
would recognize the right to marry multiple people as a fundamental 
right.  Because it is not clear what standard or test(s) the Court would 
apply, Part III will discuss and analyze three possible approaches.  Part 
III will ultimately argue that the fundamentality of the right to marry 
multiple people will probably depend on the mode of the Court’s 
analysis.  Part IV argues that even if the Court was to find that the 
fundamental right to marry includes a right to plural marriage, laws 
prohibiting polygamous marriage may not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny because such marriages pose a significant risk to the welfare 
of women and children.  Finally, Part V will conclude that, in the wake 
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, a future 
ruling as to the constitutionality of polygamous marriage will largely 
depend on the standard of scrutiny the Court applies. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES 
A. The History of the Fundamental Right to Marry 
As early as 1888, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
marriage “creat[es] the most important relation in life.” 14  Underscoring 
this sentiment, marriage has been epitomized as “the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither 
civilization nor progress.”15  Thus, the fundamentality of marriage was 
recognized, separate from Due Process Clause issues.16  Over the next 
 
 13  Id.  
 14  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (emphasis added).   
 15  Id. at 211.  See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”).  
 16  This Comment will look at polygamous marriage through the lens of substantive 
due process.  There are two types of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims: 
procedural and substantive.  Procedural due process claims ensure that proper court 
procedures are followed before an individual’s right to life, liberty, or property is taken 
away.  See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who 
We Want to Be with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. 
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seventy-nine years, the Court came to recognize the right to marry as a 
fundamental part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,17 
but marriage was not considered a separate “fundamental right.” 
In 1967, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental “freedom 
to marry.”18  In Loving v. Virginia, a couple alleged that their 
constitutional rights had been violated when they were indicted on 
charges of violating the state’s ban on interracial marriage.19  The 
Court reversed the indictment, applied strict scrutiny,20 recognized a 
fundamental right to marry, and held that the fundamental right to 
marry included the right to marry a person of a different race.21 
Over time, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to 
marry protected couples from different economic backgrounds, 
thereby reaffirming the fundamental right to marry. For example, in 
Zablocki v. Redhail,22 a group of Wisconsin residents challenged the 
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that prohibited parents behind 
 
CHALLENGES 220, 223 (2010).  Comparatively, substantive due process is a doctrine that 
has evolved to protect rights not explicitly enumerated in the constitution.  Id.  
Substantive due process is commonly accepted to encompass fundamental, or 
something akin to fundamental, rights.  See id. at 224.   
 17  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
 18  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).  
 19  Id. at 2–3. 
 20  Strict scrutiny is a standard of review courts use when reviewing cases.  
Specifically, strict scrutiny is used to determine whether restrictions of a fundamental 
right are constitutional.  “When a statutory classification significantly interferes with 
the exercise of a fundamental right,” strict scrutiny says “it cannot be upheld unless it 
is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests.”  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  However, strict 
scrutiny is not the only judicial standard of review available.  Traditionally, if a right is 
not deemed “fundamental,” the court may apply a more deferential standard of review 
known as “rational basis review.”  Rational basis review requires that “an impartial 
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public 
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.”  City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
Given that rational basis review is more deferential toward lawmakers, and since it 
doesn’t require that the law at issue be the only means possible of achieving the goal, 
it is a much easier standard to meet.  
 21  Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (internal citations omitted) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic 
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.  To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of 
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law.  The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial 
discriminations.  Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State.”). 
 22  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
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on child support from legally marrying.23  Applying strict scrutiny, the 
Court held for the plaintiffs, reaffirming that there is a fundamental 
right to marry, and extending the holding in Loving to the facts in 
Zablocki.24  Here, the Court suggested that it would be antithetical to 
recognize a right to privacy, while permitting such restrictions on the 
right to marry.25  Notably, however, the Court stated that recognition 
of a fundamental right to marry does not mean that there cannot be 
any state regulation of marriage.  Instead, the Court clarified that the 
State may regulate decisions and acts associated with marriage, so long 
as these regulations “do not significantly interfere with decisions to 
enter into the marital relationship.”26 
The fundamental right to marry was further strengthened and 
institutionalized by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Turner v. Safley.27  In this case, the Court considered whether the 
constitutionally protected right to marry applies to prison inmates.  
The Court held that it does, but it applied a lower standard of review.28  
Rather than strict scrutiny, which requires narrow tailoring, the Court 
in Turner applied the more deferential rational basis review, since this 
case dealt with prison inmates.29  Accordingly, the regulation needed 
only to be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”30 
Despite the different standard of review, this case is yet another 
example of the Court’s extension of the fundamental right to marry. 
B. The Fundamental Right to Marry Someone of the Same Sex 
While the United States Supreme Court recognized a 
fundamental right to marry, this did not mean that all individuals 
could exercise this right, free from government restriction.  Notably, 
same-sex couples remained outside the right’s protective confines.  
However, the arena of same-sex constitutional issues was not without 
 
 23  The statute would not allow parents with child support obligations to obtain a 
marriage license until they submitted proof of compliance with the obligations, and 
demonstrated that the children “are not then and are not likely thereafter to become 
public charges.”  WIS. STAT. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973) (repealed 1977).  
 24  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (“Although Loving arose in the context of racial 
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to 
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.”).  
 25  Id. at 386 (“[I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with 
respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the 
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”). 
 26  Id.  
 27  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
 28  Id. at 89.  
 29  Id.  
 30  Id.  
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judicial reform.  Years after the fundamental right to marry was 
extended to heterosexual interracial couples, debtor parents, and 
incarcerated persons, a related right was recognized and extended to 
homosexual couples in Lawrence v. Texas.31 
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge 
to the Texas Penal Code, Section 21.06(a), which criminalized sodomy 
between two individuals of the same sex.  Without identifying their 
specific standard of review,32 the Court ultimately held that such an 
“intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” was 
constitutionally unjustifiable.33 In doing so, this case extended Due 
Process Clause protection to same-sex relationships in an 
unprecedented way.34 
Then, a decade after Lawrence, United States v. Windsor35 challenged 
the constitutionality of section three of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which denied federal recognition to same-sex marriages 
validly performed under state law.36  In its opinion, the Supreme Court 
did not specify a particular standard of review37 or explicitly mention 
 
 31  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 32  Though the Court did not announce a particular standard of review, it did use 
language that suggested it was applying rational basis review.  See id. at 578 (emphasis 
added) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). 
 33  Id. at 578. 
 34  Id. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this choice.”).  
 35  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).   
 36  The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.S. §7 (1996), invalidated by United States 
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 37  Though the court did not specify which standard of review it was applying, some 
of the majority opinion’s language was reminiscent of rational basis review.  Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added) (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate 
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).  However, 
the Court’s opinion seemed to hold the Defense of Marriage Act to a higher standard 
than rational basis.  See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As nearly as I can tell, the 
Court . . . [in] its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions 
are taken from rational-basis cases . . . .  [T]he Court certainly does not apply anything 
that resembles that deferential framework.”).  See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. 
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In its words and its deed, Windsor 
established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation that is 
unquestionably higher than rational basis review.  In other words, Windsor requires 
that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual 
orientation.”); Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding of Equal 
Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 481–84 (2014); Jack 
Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 130 (2015) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s language and analysis combined with the ultimate determination of the 
Court that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, indicates that some elevated level 
of scrutiny was employed.”); Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-
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“substantive due process.”38  Nevertheless, the Court held that section 
three of DOMA was unconstitutional.  In so holding, the Court left 
section two of DOMA untouched, “allow[ing] states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriage performed under the laws of other 
states.”39  Thus, Windsor did not result in blanket acceptance of same-
sex marriage.40 
Two years later, in Obergefell, the Court finally extended the 
fundamental right to marry to homosexual couples.41  In Obergefell, as 
in Lawrence and Windsor, the Court did not expressly state the standard 
of review it applied.  In fact, the Court seemed to ignore the 
preexisting analytical framework that had been established for 
substantive due process claims.42  Instead, the Court identified four 
“principles and traditions” that demonstrated why marriage is a 
fundamental, constitutional right.43  After analyzing these four 
“principles and traditions,” the Court found that they applied equally 
to heterosexual and homosexual unions.44  As a result, the Court 
extended the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.45 
C. Why Do These Cases Matter? 
There are several lessons to be learned from the preceding review 
of Supreme Court precedent.  First, there is a fundamental right to 
 
Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2116 (2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Court did not explicitly state what level of 
scrutiny it applied in reviewing [the Defense of Marriage Act].  However, the Court’s 
opinion d[id] not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions [we]re taken from 
rational-basis cases such as Moreno and Romer.  Therefore, Windsor fits within the 
tradition of rational basis with bite.”). 
 38  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority never utters 
the dreaded words ‘substantive due process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which 
that doctrine has fallen.”).  
 39  Id. at 2682–83. 
 40  Id. at 2696–97 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
 41  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (emphasis added) (“[T]he 
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples 
of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). 
 42  Id. at 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must 
be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific 
historical practices.  Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the 
asserted right there involved (physician assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the 
approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including 
marriage and intimacy.”).  See also id. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg”).  
 43  Id. at 2589–90; see also infra Part III.C. 
 44  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015). 
 45  Id. at 2604.  
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marry that has been upheld and protected by the Court since 1967.46  
Additionally, the Court has viewed the fundamental right to marry as 
an ever-changing right.47  However, despite expansion of the 
fundamental right to marry, that right has only been extended to 
couples.48 
Furthermore, the preceding review shows that the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the fundamental right to marry has been both 
extensive and complex.  The Court has repeatedly upheld a 
fundamental right to marry, and a concurrent, yet separate, 
fundamental right to privacy.49  These holdings have been based on a 
variety of factors and tests.50  At times, the Court has completely avoided 
any language reminiscent of a standard of review, and when a specific 
method has been employed (either implicitly or explicitly), it has 
ranged from rational basis review51 to strict scrutiny.52  Thus, when 
dealing with the fundamental right to marry, the Court’s methodology 
remains relatively undefined. 
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE 
As demonstrated in Part II, the United States Supreme Court has 
yet to embrace a uniform framework for analyzing the fundamental 
right to marry.  Because of the variety of methods and tests used in 
previous cases, it is difficult to predict how the Court will analyze the 
right to plural marriage. In most substantive due process cases, the 
Court uses a two-step inquiry.  Step one asks whether the right at issue 
is “fundamental.”  Generally, the Court applies strict scrutiny to 
 
 46  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 47  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (“[C]hanged understandings of marriage 
are characteristic of a nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to 
new generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then 
are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”).  
 48  See, e.g., id. at 2607 (emphasis added) (“same-sex couples may exercise the right 
to marry in all states”). 
 49  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating, on the topic 
of marriage: “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a coming together for 
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not 
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions”).  See also Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (noting that the fundamental right to privacy “has 
some extension to activities relating to marriage”).  
 50  See infra Part II.  
 51  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
 52  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).   
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“fundamental” rights and rational basis review to non-fundamental 
rights.53  Thus, the fundamentality of a right to plural marriage can be 
determinative since a judicially recognized fundamental right is 
protected by the Constitution and cannot be impinged upon by state 
law.54 
Since Loving, the Court has struck down state laws that have 
infringed upon the fundamental right to marry.55  Most recently, in 
Obergefell, the Court extended the fundamental right to marry to same-
sex, monogamous couples.  However, a two-person limit is evident at 
various points throughout Obergefell.56  Thus, while the Court expanded 
the fundamental right to marry, it did not diverge from the 
monogamous model it has retained as a defining element of this right. 
By definition, plural marriage does not fall within the traditionally 
protected, monogamous, marital model.  As a result, the right to marry 
multiple people cannot be inferred from Obergefell, and would require 
an individualized inquiry.  Post-Obergefell, the Supreme Court could 
adopt one of three approaches to analyze challenges to restrictions on 
plural marriage. 
This Part will strive to determine whether the right to plural 
marriage is “fundamental.”  Since the Court has not adopted a uniform 
approach, this Part will view the potential fundamentality of plural 
marriage through three different lenses: the Glucksberg approach, the 
flexible approach, and the Obergefell four-part test.  As this Part will 
show, the Court’s methodology will largely dictate how it will address 
challenges to restrictions on polygamous marriage. 
 
 53  See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (noting that “‘due process of 
law’ . . . forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at 
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest”).  
 54  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within the term 
liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the states.”). 
 55  See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. 78; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.  
 56  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (emphasis added) (“The 
four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage 
is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same sex couples.”); 
id. (emphasis added) (“The right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”); id. 
(emphasis added) (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two 
persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.”); id. at 2601 (emphasis added) (“[J]ust as a couple vows to support each 
other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and 
material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”); id. at 2602 (emphasis added) 
(“The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of the 
equal protection of the laws.”).  
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A. Approach 1: The Glucksberg Approach 
In Washington v. Glucksberg,57 the Supreme Court enumerated a 
two-factor approach to be used when determining whether a right is 
fundamental.  First, the asserted right must be described narrowly, so 
as to include only the specific interests at stake.58  Second, the right 
needs to be “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”59 
In Glucksberg, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ loosely-defined 
“liberty to shape death,”60 replacing it with a narrower “right to commit 
suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”61  By 
defining the contested right narrowly, the Court placed it outside the 
protective confines of the Constitution.  Thus, judicial framing can 
determine whether or not a contested right is “fundamental.” 
Post-Obergefell, the Court may adopt the Glucksberg approach to 
decide if restrictions on polygamous marriage are constitutional.  In 
accordance with step one, it is likely that the Court will view restrictions 
on polygamous marriage in light of a narrow “right to marry multiple 
people,” rather than the broader, deeply rooted, fundamental “right to 
marry.”  Then, in step two, the Court will ask if the right to marry 
multiple people is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”62 
 
 57  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  The plaintiffs argued that the 
State’s ban on physician-assisted suicide was an unconstitutional violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 708.  The Court determined that there was not a 
fundamental right at issue, and applied rational basis review.  Id. at 728.  After applying 
rational basis review, the Court held that the ban on physician-assisted suicide was 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, and was therefore 
constitutional.  Id.   
 58  Id. at 720–21.  
 59  Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (stating 
that fundamental rights and liberties that are afforded constitutional protection are 
those that are, from an objective perspective, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition”).  But cf. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2602 (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty 
under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with 
central reference to specific historical practices.  Yet while that approach may have 
been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is 
inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental 
rights, including marriage and intimacy.”).  Because of this apparent incongruity, and 
Obergefell’s explicit repudiation of the Glucksberg framework, it is unlikely that the Court 
would ask whether or not the right to plural marriage is deeply rooted.  However, since 
this possibility is seemingly, but not completely or explicitly, banned in the case of 
polygamous marriage, this Comment will walk through the legal analysis that would 
ordinarily be required.  
 60  Id. at 722.  
 61  Id. at 723.  
 62  Id.  
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In regard to the second step, polygamy has been prohibited 
throughout Western societies for more than 1750 years. 63  In America, 
polygamy has always been viewed as an “offence against society, 
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less 
severity.”64  In fact, when states first joined the Union, they prohibited 
polygamy either by their own statute, derived from English common 
law, or by virtue of territorial prohibitions.65  Although members of 
some religions had customarily engaged in plural marriages prior to 
the Nation’s founding, neither states66 nor individuals67 were granted 
immunity from the prohibition of polygamous marriage.  Today, 
polygamous marriage remains a criminal offense, prohibited by penal 
statutes across the country.68  Thus, under the Glucksberg approach, the 
Supreme Court would probably deny that polygamy is deeply rooted, 
and would therefore likely hold that there is not a fundamental right 
to polygamous marriage. 
B. Approach 2: The Flexible Approach 
Earlier, Part II demonstrated that the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized an ever-evolving fundamental right to marry.69  
Over time, the Court has adopted a relatively flexible analysis to allow 
for the evolution of this right. Instead of carving out custom-tailored 
 
 63  See, e.g., Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, 
para. 229 (Can.) (“[F]or more than 1750 years the Western legal tradition has . . . 
declared polygamy to be an offence.  The denunciation of the practice has been based 
on natural, philosophical, political, sociological, psychological and scientific 
arguments.”).  See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (“At common 
law, the second marriage was always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), and from the earliest 
history of England polygamy has been treated as an ofence [sic.] against society.”).   
 64  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.  
 65  Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Utah 2013).  
 66  Utah was required to ban polygamous marriage in order to be accepted into 
the union.  See Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22 
DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2014) (“The Utah Constitution of 1896 permanently 
banned the practice [of polygamy], allowing Utah to attain statehood in 1896.”). See 
also UTAH CONST. art. XXIV, § 2.  
 67  See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“[A]s a law of the organization of society under the 
exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not 
be allowed.”).  
 68  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (Consol. 2016) (“A person is guilty of bigamy 
when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another person at a time 
when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse.  Bigamy is a class 
E felony.”).  See also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 741–45 (Utah 2006). 
 69  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (emphasis added) 
(“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”).  
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rights for non-traditional couples (e.g. a right to marry someone of a 
different race,70 or a right to marry someone of the same sex71), the 
Court adopted a more broad-based approach, including many non-
traditional couples under the broader umbrella of the fundamental 
right to marry.72 
The main difference between the second approach and the first 
approach is the way in which the right is defined.  Under Approach 1, 
the Glucksberg approach, the right at issue is narrowly defined.73  Under 
Approach 2, the flexible approach, the right at issue is broadly defined.  
The breadth of the second approach extends the protections 
associated with the fundamental right to marry to a greater number of 
couples. 
Members of the Court have struggled with these two approaches 
and have expressed different preferences.74  Thus far, no approach has 
triumphed.  Since members of the Court have adopted both 
approaches,75 it is difficult to predict which would be favored in future 
cases.  Furthermore, the differences in these approaches could yield 
two different views on the constitutionality of the prohibition of 
polygamous marriage. 
The United States Supreme Court seems to have adopted the 
second approach, or something akin to it, in many landmark cases 
 
 70  See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).   
 71  See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 72  This broad-based approach is similar to the Court’s approach in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  In Lawrence, the Court analyzed the Texas statute under 
the broad umbrella of “liberty,” instead of a more myopic right, the right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.  Id. at 562.  
 73  See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“[A] right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”).  
 74  Some justices have embraced the first approach, narrowly defining the right at 
issue.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(stating that the court “refer[s] to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition 
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”).  However, 
there is not a uniform approach, either between or within cases.  See, e.g., id. at 132 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (disagreeing with the majority and 
citing cases, including Loving and Turner, to point out that “[o]n occasion the Court 
has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality 
that might not be ‘the most specific level’ available”).  See also Moore v. City of E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (citations omitted) (“Appropriate limits on 
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful 
respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic values that 
underlie our society.”).  But see id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting) (“What the deeply 
rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.”).  
 75  Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705 (“[A] right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant 
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent 
dimensions.”).  
BEYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:29 PM 
2016] COMMENT 209 
dealing with the fundamental right to marry.76  Under this approach, 
the Court has viewed the borders of the fundamental right to marry as 
relatively malleable.  Resultantly, the Court has extended the 
protections associated with the fundamental right to marry to 
interracial couples,77 inmates,78 and parents who have not paid child 
support.79 
It is feasible that the Court could use this flexible approach if 
asked to analyze the constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage.  
Use of this approach would likely entail analysis under the broader 
umbrella of the fundamental right to marry, eliminating the need for 
a separate analysis of the “right to marry multiple people.”  Since the 
fundamental right to marry is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,” the Court would probably conclude that the 
fundamental right to marry encompasses a right to plural marriage. 
C. Approach 3: The Obergefell Four-Part Test 
In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court adopted a third 
approach, a four-part test.  Using this approach, the Court compared 
same-sex marriage to marriage more generally, and considered 
whether the “principles and traditions [that] demonstrate the reasons 
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal 
force”80 to those in same-sex marriages.  Ultimately, the Court held that 
each of the four principles and traditions applied equally.81 
Under this approach, the Court may try to envelop polygamous 
marriage in the cloak of the fundamental right to marry.  To do so, the 
Court would need to determine whether the “principles and traditions 
[that] demonstrate the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force”82 to those in polygamous 
marriages.  The four “principles and traditions” include (1) “individual 
autonomy,”83 (2) the importance of the “two-person union,”84 (3) the 
 
 76  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial 
marriage’; Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki did not 
ask about a ‘right of father with unpaid child support duties to marry.’  Rather, each 
case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was 
a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”).  
 77  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 78  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
 79  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).  
 80  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.  
 81  Id. at 2589.  
 82  Id.   
 83  Id.  
 84  Id.  
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rights of “childrearing, procreation, and education,”85 and (4) “social 
order.”86 
First, the Court would need to determine whether the right to 
marry multiple people implicates “individual autonomy.”87  Generally, 
an individual’s decisions regarding marriage have profound 
implications for many aspects of one’s freedom.88  Arguably, there is 
nothing that would distinguish the choice to enter into a polygamous 
marriage from the choice to enter into a monogamous marriage.  At 
their core, both decisions involve the decision to marry, and the 
Court’s analysis in Obergefell emphasized this unifying principle.89  
Because of this broad scope, it is conceivable that the Court could find 
that this factor also applies to polygamous marriages. 
Second, the Court found “that the right to marry is fundamental 
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its 
importance to the committed individuals.”90  Applying this finding to 
same-sex marriages, the Court held that protection given to the 
intimate relationship between two married individuals does not vary 
based on sexual orientation.91  Rather, the Court’s analysis of this factor 
seemed to turn on the intimate relationship between married 
individuals and the constitutional protections afforded to that 
relationship.92  Superficially, this logic seems to apply to those in 
polygamous marriages.  However, the Obergefell Court specifically 
quantified the union as being between two individuals.93  Consequently, 
in future cases the Court may either: (1) decide to focus on the “union” 
aspect of this factor, and the importance of protecting the intimate 
relationship between married individuals;94 or (2) choose to preserve 
the “two-person” limit spelled out in Obergefell.  If the Court takes the 
second approach, polygamous marriage would be seen as conflicting 
with the traditional, constitutionally protected right to marry. 
 
 85  Id. at 2590.  
 86  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590.  
 87  Id. at 2589. 
 88  For example, expression, intimacy, and sexuality. Id. at 2590. 
 89  Id. at 2589 (citations omitted) (“Decisions about marriage are the most intimate 
that an individual can make.  This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual 
orientation.”). 
 90  Id.  
 91  Id. at 2600.  
 92  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.   
 93  Id. at 2599 (emphasis added) (“two-person union unlike any other”).  
 94  Id. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might 
call out only to find no one there.  It offers the hope of companionship and 
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care 
for the other.”).  
BEYE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  7:29 PM 
2016] COMMENT 211 
Third, the Court said same-sex marriage should be protected 
because it “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning 
from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”95  
This factor may be the most challenging for plural marriage advocates 
to overcome because many studies have shown that polygamous 
marriage poses a harm to women and children.96  For this reason, it is 
likely that the Court would distinguish polygamous marriages from 
monogamous marriages. 
Lastly, the Court emphasized that marriage is important to our 
nation because it is “the keystone of our social order.”97  Like same-sex 
marriage, polygamous marriage is not deeply rooted in our nation’s 
legal tradition.  However, in Obergefell, the court focused on the 
traditional, generalized, importance of “marriage,” rather than “same-
sex marriage” specifically.98  Here, the Court observed that marriage is 
a key part of many legal and social rights.99  By denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry, states were also barring them from 
accessing these legal and social rights.100  Similarly, those in plural 
marriages are denied access to the legal and social rights that are 
reserved to married couples.  For this reason, polygamous marriage is 
akin to same-sex marriage, pre-Obergefell.  Since the Obergefell Court 
recognized the importance of making such rights available to all 
married individuals, this factor would probably weigh in favor of 
protecting those in plural marriages. 
In sum, factors one and four seem to favor protecting individuals 
in plural marriages.  However, factors two and three present some 
hurdles for plural marriage advocates.  Given the novelty of this test, 
future use and analysis of these factors is yet to be determined.  
Resultantly, an analysis using these factors could either favor or 
disfavor plural marriage. 
D.  Is There a Fundamental Right to Plural Marriage? 
In the wake of Obergefell, it is unclear whether the Court would 
recognize a fundamental right to a plural marriage.  If faced with the 
constitutionality of restrictions on plural marriage, there are three 
 
 95  Id.   
 96  See infra Part IV.  Note that, though there is a large body of evidence suggesting 
that polygamous marriage can and does significantly harm women and children, the 
evidence is not conclusive.   
 97  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.  
 98  Id. (“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with 
respect to this principle.”). 
 99  Id. at 2601. 
 100  Id.  
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main approaches the Court may take.  If the Court uses the “deeply-
rooted” approach it would probably hold against protecting those in 
plural marriages.  However, if the Court adopts the flexible approach, 
plural marriages may be protected as a subpart of the more general 
fundamental right to marry.  The Court’s analysis of polygamous 
marriage under the Obergefell four-part test is less clear.  Unlike the 
Glucksberg approach or the flexible approach, this third approach 
could weigh for or against legal recognition of polygamous marriages. 
As analysis of these three approaches shows, the United States 
Supreme Court could recognize a fundamental right to plural 
marriage.  If it did so, it would likely be under the guise of the more 
general, fundamental right to marry.101  However, this would not be the 
end of the conversation—the Court would then need to look at the 
means and ends of the legislation at issue, as well as any alternative 
options. 
IV. EVEN IF THE RIGHT TO PLURAL MARRIAGE IS FUNDAMENTAL, CAN IT 
SURVIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
There are two steps to determining whether a particular piece of 
legislation is constitutional under a substantive due process analysis.  
First, the Court must determine whether there is a fundamental right 
at issue.  Part III demonstrated that plural marriage may be viewed as 
a fundamental right.  Since it is possible that the Court may view plural 
marriage as a fundamental right,102 Part IV will examine the second 
question—whether anti-polygamy legislation can survive judicial 
review. 
Traditionally, the applicable level of scrutiny depends on whether 
the right is “fundamental.”  Generally, strict scrutiny has been applied 
to cases where a fundamental right has been identified.103  Under “strict 
scrutiny,” the government action must be narrowly tailored to promote 
a compelling state interest.104  Thus, strict scrutiny requires a two-part 
analysis: (1) whether the state has a compelling interest in limiting the 
 
 101  In Obergefell, the Court clearly said that it was going to look at marriage in 
general, instead of as an amalgamation of separate rights.  Id. at 2602.   
 102  As Part III shows, the Court may view plural marriage as either “the right to 
marry multiple people,” or as part of the broader-based “right to marry.”  See infra Part 
III.   
 103  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).  
 104  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (“When a statutory classification significantly 
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests.”).  See supra note 20.  
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fundamental right, and (2) whether the state action is narrowly tailored 
to furthering that compelling interest. 
The State has a compelling interest in prohibiting plural marriage 
because of the danger it poses to women and children.105  Some studies 
have shown polygamous marriage to harm women and children both 
in terms of their physical wellbeing (e.g. by abuse and increased health 
risks106), and in terms of their emotional wellbeing.107  The fact that 
plural marriage poses this danger to women and children 
differentiates it from same-sex marriage.108  Though there are studies 
to the contrary,109 the potential for such substantial harm may allow the 
State to lawfully restrict plural marriage.110 
A. Harm to Women 
Women are harmed by polygamous marriage, and the State has a 
compelling interest in prohibiting this harm.  Most prominently, 
polygamy violates norms of gender equality111 since it is a “deeply 
 
 105  See Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of 
Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 239–40 (2001) (“The courts have an 
interest in protecting women and children from the strikingly real crimes committed 
in polygamous communities.”).  
 106  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 
8 (Can.) (noting that women in polygamous marriages “are more likely to die in 
childbirth and live shorter lives than their monogamous counterparts”).  
 107  See Salman Elbedour et al., The Effect of Polygamous Marital Structure of Behavioral, 
Emotional, and Academic Adjustment in Children: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 5 
CLINICAL CHILD AND FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 255, 259 (2002) (“[T]he stress of polygamous 
family life predisposes mothers and children to psychological problems.”).   
 108  Nicholas Bala, Why Canada’s Prohibition of Polygamy is Constitutionally Valid and 
Sound Social Policy, 25 CAN. J. FAM. L. 165, 169 (2009) (“Unlike the recognition of same-
sex marriage, which promoted equality, protected the interests of children and saved 
government resources, the recognition of polygamy would promote inequality, impose 
costs on society, and harm children.”).  See also id. at 177 (polygamy “raises very 
different social and constitutional issues from the recognition of same-sex marriage”).  
 109  But see Angela Campbell, Bountiful Voices, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 183 (2009) 
(drawing on interviews with women in a Canadian polygamous community, Campbell 
presents a counter-narrative, arguing that polygamy is not always as harmful as it is 
made out to be); Emily Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love is a Many 
Splendored Thing,” 15 DUKE J. GEND. L. & POL’Y 315, 332 (2008) (arguing that “legalizing 
polygamy would positively affect polygynist women and children” and that 
“[c]ondemning every practicing polygynist to prevent the abuses of some may be 
counterintuitive”).  
 110  See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006) (“[M]artial relationships serve 
as the building blocks of our society.  The State must be able to assert some level of 
control over those relationships to ensure the smooth operation of laws and further 
the proliferation of social unions our society deems beneficial while discouraging 
those deemed harmful.”).  
 111  See Bala, supra note 108, at 182 (“[T]he social reality today is that polygyny is the 
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patriarchal institution.”112  Though, in theory, plural marriage can be 
between a woman and multiple men, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases plural marriage takes the form of one man marrying multiple 
women (i.e. polygyny).113  In many polygamous communities, wives’ 
roles are determined by theology and the structure of their families.114  
Because of their position within the family, “[w]omen in polygamous 
marriages are in an inherently vulnerable and unequal position in 
social and economic terms, and are more likely to be victims of 
domestic violence.”115  There are many reports of husbands abusing 
their wives, and of wives abusing one another.116  At times, the animosity 
between co-wives is palpable, even to external family members.117 
Women in polygamous marriages may also witness the abuse of 
their co-wives.118  Oftentimes, co-wives will not intervene to stop such 
 
only form of polygamy that is widely practiced, and many of the concerns about 
polygyny are based on the inherent inequality in a relationship where one man has 
two or more wives.  The recognition of the importance of monogamy and gender 
equality, combined with the negative psychological and physical health effects on 
women and children, help explain why there is a growing international trend to 
prohibit or restrict polygamy.”).  See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 
(1879) (“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle . . . which, when applied to large 
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot 
long exist in connection with monogamy.”).  
 112  Bala, supra note 108, at 168.  See also Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 13 (Can.) (stating that the patriarchal nature of 
“[p]olygamy also institutionalized gender inequality”).  
 113  Al-Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 745.  
 114  Bala, supra note 108, at 192 (quoting COMM. ON POLYGAMOUS ISSUES, LIFE IN 
BOUNTIFUL: A REPORT IN THE LIFESTYLE OF A POLYGAMOUS CMTY. 12 (Apr. 1993)).  
 115  Id. at 210.   
 116  Id. (“Although some plural wives report harmonious, ‘sisterly’ relationships, 
competition between wives (and sometimes their children) is an unfortunate reality in 
many polygamous families, and it is not uncommon for a dominant wife to physically 
abuse other wives.”).  
 117   The Canadian Case, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, cited 
the testimony of a child of a polygamous marriage, who noted that her relationship 
with her father’s other wives was “[v]ery strange . . . with the two women who’d married 
him before [her] mother, [and her relationship was] much like the relationship [her] 
mother had with them.”  She said, “[m]y mother was my dad’s favourite wife, and being 
the favourite wife is a curse.  You don’t want it.  Because the other women are envious 
of it and everybody is vying for it, and so you’re put down and torn down and ostracized 
in a lot of ways.  Some women, I’ll hear them talk about this great camaraderie they 
have with their sister wives, and I say not true, because every day of your life is 
competition for his resources, and they are limited and there’s not enough of him to 
go around.”  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, 
para. 667 (Can.).  
 118  Dena Hassouneh-Phillips, Polygamy and Wife Abuse: A Qualitative Study of Muslim 
Women in America, 22 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 735, 744 (2001).  
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violence.119  Additionally, some wives perpetuate violence themselves.120  
One of the most prominent and disturbing examples of violence in 
polygamous marriages is the “Shafia family murders,” which occurred 
in 2009.  In a quadruple honor killing, the husband (Mohammad 
Shafia), his second wife, and his son murdered Shafia’s first wife (who 
was infertile) and his three daughters (believing them to be too 
“Western”).121 
Women in polygamous marriages are not only more susceptible 
to physical harm; they are also more prone to emotional and 
psychological harm.122  In a study comparing Bedouin Arab women in 
monogamous marriages to Bedouin Arab women in polygamous 
marriages, researchers Alean Al-Krenawi and John R. Graham found 
that women in polygamous marriages “showed significantly more 
psychological distress than their counterparts in monogamous 
marriages.”123  Specifically, these women were more likely to report 
higher levels of somatization, obsession-compulsion, depression, 
interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobia, anxiety, paranoid ideation, 
psychotism, and GSI-general symptom severity.124  The study’s findings 
also evidenced a negative correlation between polygamy and life 
satisfaction, as well as the quality of women’s marital and family lives.125  
Though this study was not performed in the United States, and its 
transferability is limited accordingly, it does show the comparative 
effect of polygamous marriages on women. 
B. Harm to Children 
In addition to women, children are also harmed by polygamous 
marriage.  Polygamous marriages pose several risk factors, the most 
significant being “family conflict, family distress, the absence of the 
 
 119  Id.  
 120  See id. at 745 (“In cases where emotional, physical, and/or sexual abuse was 
ongoing, co-wives sometimes became combatants.”).  
 121  Melinda Dalton, Shafia Jury Finds All Guilty of 1st-degree Murder, CBC NEWS 
MONTREAL (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/shafia-jury-
finds-all-guilty-of-1st-degree-murder-1.1150023.  
 122  See Bala, supra note 108, at 192–93 (referring to the findings of the Committee 
on Polygamous Issues, saying that “the indoctrinated conformity and lack of personal 
empowerment for women leads to an underdeveloped sense of self, an inability to 
understand or exercise choice, and a blurring of personal and collective identity”).  
 123  Alean Al-Krenawi & John R. Graham, A Comparison of Family Functioning, Life and 
Marital Satisfactions, and Mental Health of Women in Polygamous and Monogamous 
Marriages, 52 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 5, 10 (2006).  
 124  Id.  
 125  Id. 
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father, and financial stress.”126  Combined, these risk factors negatively 
affect a child’s emotional and physical development and wellbeing.  
Because plural marriage poses this threat, states have a compelling 
interest in prohibiting plural marriage. 
1. Familial Conflict and Distress 
Marital conflict is often a defining characteristic of polygamous 
marriages.127  Oftentimes such conflict manifests itself in physical or 
emotional abuse. 128  Such abuse has been shown to negatively impact a 
child’s physical, emotional, and social development.129  Even if children 
are not directly harmed in the course of fights between their parents, 
or between their parents and themselves, the fighting can still wreak 
havoc on their developing bodies and psyches, causing permanent 
damage.130 
For example, children in abusive households are more likely to 
exhibit signs of distress and anger, such as running away from their 
home and being violent with others.131  They are also more likely to 
internalize emotional issues, leading to increased levels of depression 
and anxiety.132  In fact, feelings of depression may be so severe that the 
child may feel as though there is no way out, precipitating suicidal and 
homicidal thoughts.133  This cognitive experience has been termed the 
 
 126  Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 258.  
 127  Id. (“Considerable research demonstrates that children of polygamous families 
experience a higher incidence of martial conflict, family violence, and family 
disruptions then do children of monogamous families.”).  
 128  Such physical and emotional abuse is also known as “spousal abuse.”  See JAVAD 
H. KASHANI & WESLEY D. ALLAN, THE IMPACT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS 33 (1998) (defining spousal abuse as “a behavior pattern, 
characteristically inflicted on a female by a male, that occurs in physical, emotional, 
and psychological forms”).   
 129  See, e.g., Abigail H. Gewirtz & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Young Children’s Exposure to 
Intimate Partner Violence: Towards a Developmental Risk and Resilience Framework for Research 
and Intervention, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 151 (2003) (“exposure to intimate partner 
violence can variably affect a child’s development depending on other individual and 
environmental influences”).  
 130  See Paul R. Amato & Juliana M. Sobolewski, The Effects of Divorce and Marital 
Discord on Adult Children’s Psychological Well-Being, 66 AM. PSYCHOL. REV. 900 (2001) 
(“Using 17-year longitudinal data from two generations, results show that divorce and 
marital discord predict lower levels of psychological well-being in adulthood.”); 
Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal citations omitted) (“The psychological 
literature suggests that marital distress is linked with suppressed immune function, 
cardiovascular arousal, and increases in stress-related hormones.”).  
 131  KASHANI & ALLAN, supra note 128, at 37.  
 132  Id. at 37–39. 
 133  Id. at 38–39. 
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“lockage phenomenon.”134  Significantly, children in abusive homes are 
also more likely to have issues with their social development.135  Marital 
problems, specifically, have been shown to have dramatic, negative 
effects on childhood development.136  Additionally, researchers have 
shown that in those families where a child’s father abuses his or her 
mother, the father is also more likely to abuse the child as well.137 
Marital conflict also affects a child’s interactions with other family 
members.  For example, conflict between parents may lead to 
displaced parental aggression; the parents may direct their frustration 
and anger toward their children, who become “scapegoats.”138  
Additionally, because of the level of conflict in plural marriage 
households, older siblings may need to step into a parenting role for 
their younger siblings, and also (sometimes) for their parents.139  Thus 
role assumption can cause emotional issues for the older child later on 
in the child’s life.140 
Furthermore, polygamous marriages are often marked by periods 
of intense disruption, due to the fluid nature of the marriage.141  Such 
modification of the marital unit can negatively impact a “developing 
child’s trust, security, and confidence.”142  Thus, since plural marriages 
carry a high risk of both conflict and instability, they pose a danger to 
children in them. 
 
 134  See id. (The “‘lockage phenomenon’. . . proposes that in conflicted or abusive 
families, an adolescent may be under such intense and relentless pressure, either from 
abuse or witnessing of abuse, that he or she can only see two possible means of escape: 
suicide or homicide”).   
 135  Id. at 39–40. 
 136  See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 258–59 (internal citations omitted) 
(“Development outcomes of children predicted by marital problems include the 
following: poor social competence, a poorly developed sense of security, poor school 
achievement, misconduct and aggression, and elevated heart rate reactivity.  Marital 
conflict is also likely to disrupt effective parenting and parental involvement.  Further, 
children who experience intense marital conflict tend to use aggressive behaviors as a 
means of problem solving, show hostile patterns of interaction, and may be forced to 
ally with one parent against the other.”). 
 137  KASHANI & ALLAN, supra note 128, at 35.  
 138  Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259.  
 139  Id.  
 140  Id.  
 141  Id.  
 142  See id. at 258 (“It is likely then that the sudden shift from a monogamous to a 
polygamous family system that occurs when a new spouse is added to the family would 
constitute just the kind of a major challenge to a developing child’s sense of trust, 
security, and confidence.”).  
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2. The Absence of a Father 
Sarah Hammon’s father, a member of the Fundamentalist Latter 
Day Saints (FLDS) church, had nineteen wives and seventy-five 
children; she, personally, was raised in a home with thirty siblings.  Of 
her relationship with her father she said: 
I didn’t have a relationship with my dad.  He didn’t know my 
name or who my mother was or even that I was his child unless 
I was in the house with him.  And that was for 13 years that I 
lived with him . . . .  I felt very lost in the family.  Like a number 
more than . . . a valuable member of it.143 
Since a father’s time is split between more children, the growing size 
of polygamous families can pose significant problems.  As the number 
of children and wives increases, interfamilial bonds become 
increasingly attenuated.144 
The absence of a father figure negatively affects children in 
polygamous marriages.145  Summarizing the available research, 
Elbedour et al. concluded that “there are four key correlates of a 
father’s absence that have the strongest effect on children: (a) 
economic distress, which is associated with academic and psychosocial 
maladjustment; (b) the child’s perception of abandonment by the 
father; (c) social isolation; and (d) parental conflict.”146  These key 
correlates have the potential to evoke lasting psychological and 
physical harm. 
3. Financial Stress 
Polygamy is associated with high fertility rates, causing many 
polygamous families to have economic needs beyond their means.147  
The relatively large size of polygamous families affects children by 
decreasing the amount of economic resources available to them,148  
 
 143  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 
667 (Can.) (citing Transcript at 67; 83-84 (8 December, 2010).  
 144  See Bala, supra note 108, at 198 (“Although children are surrounded by many 
sibling role models, and may receive care from more than one maternal figure, they 
receive less care and attention as more children are added to the family: both mother 
and father become less available, and the bonds between parent and child weaken.”).  
 145  See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal quotation omitted).  
 146  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 147  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 
13 (Can.); see also Tamar Ezer et al., Divorce Reform: Rights Protections in the New 
Swaziland, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 883, 898 n.89 (2007) (“People in polygamous 
relationships tend to be very poor.  The most vulnerable children come from 
polygamous relationships.”) (quoting Interview with Phindile Weatherson, Bank 
Personnel, in Ezulwini, Swaz. (Mar. 7, 2006)).   
 148  See Bala, supra note 108, at 198 (“[T]he more wives and children, the fewer 
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leading “many polygamous families in the United States [to] receive 
social assistance.”149  Significantly, this strain can impact children 
mentally, as well as physically, by causing problems such as “depression, 
antisocial behavior, and poor impulse control; poor academic 
outcomes; and self-concept.”150  It can also negatively affect the way in 
which a mother cares for her children, precipitating emotional 
distress.151 
In conclusion, marital conflict, marital distress, the absence of a 
father, and financial stress affect a child’s mental and physical 
wellbeing.  This can start a “downward cycle of conflict,” since a child’s 
wellbeing may increase tension between his or her parents.152  A 2008 
study of polygamous marriage amongst Bedouin Arabs in Israel 
exemplifies the problems associated with polygamous marriages and 
the way in which it negatively impacts children.  In this study, the 
authors found that children in polygamous marriages were more likely 
than children in monogamous marriages to suffer from psychiatric 
illnesses and issues, “including somatization, obsessive compulsion, 
depression, interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, phobic anxiety, 
paranoid ideation, and psychosis.”153  Additionally, children in 
polygamous marriages reported experiencing issues relating to their 
peers, performing poorly in school, and having worse relationships 
with their fathers.154 
4. Effect on Adolescent Males 
Polygamy also poses a threat to the wellbeing of adolescent males.  
In many polygamous communities, and in FLDS communities in 
particular, many adolescent and young men are effectively forced to 
leave the community to ensure that the “chosen” men have multiple 
wives.155  These young men are usually ill equipped to face life outside 
of the confines of polygamous life. The main reason for this is that 
these young men usually have inadequate educations and insufficiently 
 
resources available for each family member.”).  
 149  Id.  
 150  See id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).  
 151  See Elbedour et al., supra note 107, at 259 (internal citation omitted) (“[T]he 
mother’s distress has serious implication[s] for her children, because it can diminish 
her level of caring, supervision, and involvement.  Some distressed mothers can 
become withdrawn, depressed, and even hostile towards their children.”).  
 152  Al-Krenawi & Graham, supra note 123, at 10.  
 153  Al- Krenawi & Slonim-Nevo, supra note 7, at 759.  
 154  Id.  
 155  Bala, supra note 108, at 192.  
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developed life skills and social support.156 
Additionally, an increase in unmarried men poses a threat to 
society because unmarried men are “statistically predisposed to 
violence and other anti-social behavior.”157  Since polygyny is the most 
common form of polygamy, legalization of polygamy would likely lead 
more men to take more wives, decreasing the pool of potential 
brides.158  This could result in increased crime levels and a more 
prevalent exhibition of antisocial behavior by the large number of 
young, unmarried males.159 
In his report, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and 
Implications,” Dr. Joseph Heinrich found that unmarried men commit 
crimes more often, and the crimes they commit are often much more 
serious than the crimes committed by married men.160  Dr. Heinrich 
also found that marriage could decrease a man’s probability of 
criminal activity as much as thirty-five percent.161  Chief Justice Bauman 
of the Supreme Court of British Columbia found this study to be 
particularly compelling because of the breadth of the population 
studied; the study that Dr. Heinrich relied upon tracked the criminal 
activity of men ages seventeen to seventy.162  After conducting a cross-
country comparison, Dr. Heinrich also found that polygamy is widely 
associated with higher levels of both murder and rape.163  Additionally, 
he found that higher crime rates were generally associated with greater 
numbers of unmarried males.164  This supports the belief that legalized 
polygamy, by increasing the number of unwed young males, could lead 
to higher crime rates. 
C. The State’s “Compelling Interest” 
The harms inherent in plural marriages were highlighted in the 
landmark Canadian case, Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588 (Can.).  Canada’s parliament prohibits 
polygamy in Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada.  This case 
 
 156  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 
11 (Can.).   
 157  Id. at para. 13.  
 158  Id. at para. 499 (regarding the conclusions of Dr. Joseph Henrich’s study, 
“Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and Implications”).  
 159  Id.  
 160  Id. at para. 508.  
 161  Id. at para 509. 
 162  Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 2011 B.C.S.C. 1588, para. 
509 (Can.).   
 163  Id. at para. 511.   
 164  Id. at para 509. 
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was brought by British Columbia to determine whether the prohibition 
of polygamy remained consistent with the Canadian Constitution, post-
legalization of same-sex marriage.  In his majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Bauman concluded that “this case is essentially about harm . . . .  
This includes harm to women, to children, to society and to the 
institution of monogamous marriage.”165  He therefore held that the 
prohibition of polygamy does not constitute an unconstitutional 
prohibition.166  Because of the strength of the evidence attesting to the 
harm caused by polygamous marriages, it seems likely that the United 
States Supreme Court could find a similarly compelling interest. 
Some supporters of polygamous marriages have analogized 
polygamous marriage to same-sex marriage, arguing that both are 
“equally legitimate.”167  However, polygamous marriage is a distinct 
institution.168  Most prominently, the harm that polygamous marriage 
causes to women and children is well documented and differentiates a 
constitutional analysis of polygamous marriage from a similar analysis 
of same-sex marriage. 
In Obergefell, the third of the Court’s four reasons for recognizing 
the right to marry someone of the same sex was that such recognition 
would protect children and families.169  In contrast, the State may have 
a compelling reason to prohibit polygamous marriage since there is 
substantial evidence that polygamous marriages cause substantial 
harm to women and children.  Thus, Obergefell’s holding cannot be 
automatically applied to polygamous marriage.  For the purposes of 
this Comment, it seems the most important exception to Obergefell’s 
holding (if it is not found to be limited to couples) is the institution of 
polygamous marriage itself. 
D. Is the Prohibition of Polygamous Marriage “Narrowly Tailored”? 
It seems that the State has a compelling interest in prohibiting 
polygamous marriage.  Thus, the remaining question is the 
 
 165  Id. at para. 5.  
 166  Id. at para. 1361 (the law “is substantially constitutional and peripherally 
problematic”).   
 167  Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for 
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1957 (2010).  
 168  See id. (“[W]hile the gay analogy may make for splashy punditry and good 
television, it distracts us from what is truly distinctive, and legally meaningful, about 
polygamy—namely, its challenges to the regulatory assumptions inherent in the two-
person marital model.”).  Also, many American laws are tailored to the two-personal 
marital model.  Examples include tax law, health law, estate law, divorce law, and family 
law.  Recognition of polygamous marriage as a legal marital institution would require 
substantial changes to such laws.   
 169  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).  
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relationship of the “ends” (protection of women and children from the 
harms of polygamous marriage) to the “means” (the prohibition of 
polygamous marriage).  Under strict scrutiny, the State needs to show 
that the prohibition of polygamous marriage is the only way to protect 
women and children from the associated harms.  Generally, domestic 
violence laws, child support laws, child custody laws, and child 
marriage laws protect women and children from some of the specific 
harms associated with polygamous marriage.  As a result, it might be 
difficult to show that prohibition of polygamous marriage is the only 
way to protect women and children from associated harms.  Thus, 
prohibition of polygamy may fail under the narrowly tailored prong of 
the strict scrutiny test. 
Even if the United States Supreme Court were to conclude that 
anti-polygamy legislation is not narrowly tailored, it would not 
automatically toll the death-knell for anti-polygamy legislation.  Thus 
far, the Court has declined to articulate a specific standard of review 
for cases dealing with the fundamental right to marry.170  Instead of 
applying strict scrutiny, the Court may apply rational-basis review as it 
did in Turner v. Safley.  Under rational basis review, the protection of 
women and children need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.171  Because this is a much easier standard for the State to 
satisfy, prohibition of polygamous marriage is more likely to be upheld.  
The State clearly has a legitimate interest (the protection of women 
and children from the harms of polygamous marriage), and the 
prohibition of polygamous marriage is rationally related to 
accomplishing that goal.  Thus, a determination of the 
constitutionality of anti-polygamy legislation could depend on the 
mode of judicial analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a fundamental right to marry that has been repeatedly 
recognized and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court.172  If 
the right to marry multiple people is seen as part of this fundamental 
right, restrictions on polygamous marriage would probably be 
subjected to heightened scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny, though not wholly 
 
 170  See supra Part II.  
 171  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The 
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
 172  See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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insulating,173 is a hard standard for the State to satisfy.  Given the 
presence of alternative options, under strict scrutiny restrictions on 
polygamous marriage would probably be considered unconstitutional.  
However, the Supreme Court has not yet held that strict scrutiny would 
be required, and thus it is equally likely that rational basis review or 
another deferential standard may apply.  It would be relatively easy for 
the Court to justify the prohibition of polygamous marriage under a 
less scrutinizing standard, given the strength of the State’s compelling 
interest in protecting women and children. 
Despite the findings and conclusions made in this Comment, 
which weigh against the legalization of polygamous marriage, there are 
undoubtedly those who will argue in favor of polygamy’s 
constitutionality, on other grounds.174  This Comment has viewed the 
constitutionality of polygamy through the lens of substantive due 
process.  Thus, other constitutional arguments are beyond the breadth 
of this Comment. 
Post-Obergefell, the constitutionality of polygamous marriage is 
unclear.  Inclusion, or a lack thereof, of polygamous marriage in the 
fundamental right to marry will largely determine whether or not 
polygamous marriage is viewed as a fundamental right.  Additionally, 
even if polygamous marriage is held to be a fundamental right, we do 
not yet know which standard of review the Supreme Court would 
apply.175  Despite the particular form of judicial review, polygamous 
marriage will still be haunted by the harm it can cause to women and 
children.  Evidence of such harm may be a major hurdle to a judicially-
recognized right to marry multiple people.  Perhaps even more 
 
 173  Strict scrutiny is not always fatal to the legislation at issue.  See Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion 
that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”).  
 174  For example, some plural marriage advocates have argued that polygamy is a 
religious belief that is protected by the First Amendment.  However, American courts 
have repeatedly rejected this argument.  Resultantly, there is a wide body of precedent 
testifying to the fact that participants in polygamous marriage cannot use their religion 
as a shield.  See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (stating that 
“the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a 
prospection for bigamy”); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 746 (Utah 2006) (holding that 
“Utah’s prohibition on polygamous behavior does not run afoul of constitutional 
guarantees protecting the free exercise of religion”); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 
(Utah 2004) (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Reynolds and holding that “Utah’s 
bigamy statute does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution”); State v. Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008) (“The United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the protection of 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the practice of polygamy.”).  
 175  The Court could choose to apply any standard of review in the spectrum, from 
rational basis review to strict scrutiny.  
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importantly, though Obergefell widened access to the fundamental right 
to marry, entrance remains limited to two people at a time. 
 
